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SEXUAL DEVIATION AND THE LAWS OF OHIO
Each age at some time looks at itself and weighs its manners and
morals in light of what has gone before and what new refinements have
been made. Often the result is a smug acceptance of this as "the best of
all possible worlds." Occasionally, when the self examination is particu-
larly searching, the age admits the defects of the extant social order
and is led toward a more enlightened approach in the area examined.
Such an analysis may recently have been made by a committee of
the Home Office of the United Kingdom. The Committee on Homo-
sexual Offenses and Prostitution, commonly referred to as the
Wolfenden Committee, examined the contemporary legal treatment of
certain segments of the British community and advised a revision of the
laws of Great Britain in this area into a more realistic conformity with
the findings of the behavioristic disciplines of sociology and psychology.,
The reaction to this report in the popular press, in legal literature,
and among religious and political leaders demonstrates a willingness in
many quarters to pierce the taboo that has shrouded the area of sex
deviation and to support a more tolerant program to deal with the
problem of homosexuality specifically and sex deviation generally.
Whether Ohio shares in this movement toward greater latitude in
the treatment of the sexual deviate is open to argument; whether it
should is the matter at hand. The scope of this comment is to review
some selected areas of the Ohio law pertaining to sexual deviation with
the aim of noting any defects existent in these laws.
ANTECEDENTS AND INFLUENCES
Any consideration of the historical evolution of attitudes toward
the sexual offender must bear in mind that such attitudes are the product
1 REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMrTTEE oN HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND
PROSTITUTION OF THE HOME OFFICE (1957), Sir John Wolfenden, Chairman. "Un-
less a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting through the agency of the
law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, there must remain a realm of
private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's
business. To say this is not to condone or encourage private immorality. On the
contrary, to emphasize the personal and private nature of moral or immoral con-
duct is to emphasize the personal and private responsibility of the individual for
his actions, and that is a responsibility which a mature agent can properly be
expected to carry for himself without the threat of punishment from the law. It is
not the function of the law to intervene in the private lives of citizens, or to seek
to enforce any particular pattern of behaviour." Paragraph 62. "Homosexual be-
haviour between consenting adults in private be no longer a criminal offense."
Paragraphs 63 and 64. "The questions relating to 'consent' and 'in private' be
decided by the same criteria as apply in the case of heterosexual acts between
adults." Paragraph 71. "The age of 'adulthood' for the purposes of the proposed
change in the law be fixed at twenty-one." Paragraph 187. "That a court by which
a person under twenty-one is found guilty of a homosexual offense be required to
obtain and consider a psychiatric report before passing sentence."
19591 COMMENTS
of the society in which they are found. After the genesis of these atti-
tudes, they may continue to shape the society itself, thereby requiring
social conformity even after the basis for their conception is extinct.
It should be noted at the outset that our present social system is but
one of many alternatives. Other highly developed societies have not
shared the views we presently hold; for example, the city states of
Greece found homosexuality to be quite compatible with their existent
social order.2 The basis was partially economic necessity and partially
the supplemental character of homosexuality to the educational and
military goals. On the other hand, the ancient Hebrew society found
it necessary to encourage a large population upon which it could draw
for military purposes to protect an area constantly subjected to invasion
by neighboring states. Homosexuality was incompatible with this aim.
3
The theocratic government merged military necessity with religious
disciplines.
The current American view, as expressed in our statutory enact-
ments and judicial decisions, is most directly rooted in Judeao-Christian
religious philosophy as it has evolved. It is in the Old Testament that
we find many precepts that are echoed in modern state codes.4 Through-
out the middle ages the ecclesiastical courts exercised great control over
religious and moral conformity in the community, and in this way
colored much of the judgment in sexual matters by often equating
deviation with heresy. It was from these same ecclesiastical courts that
the common law courts of England drew their pattern for the regu-
lation of human sexual behavior during the late medieval and Renais-
sance periods.' With minor modifications we find a similar approach in
contemporary legislation.
Primarily, the historical development of legal control of sexual
conduct has been the enforcement of the moral code of the culture.
Generally, social mores have been affected by the changes taking place
within that culture. In light of the advancements made in the past half-
century in the medical and social sciences, it might be hoped that legal
treatment of sexually deviant behavior would have undergone major
modifications. This, however, is not the case. "Except perhaps for
religion, there is no subject on which it is more difficult for us to think
with scientific objectivity than sex. And in truth it is herein that much
of the fault lies, for in the minds of most of us the two are inextricably,
although not always consciously, bound." 6  Anglo-American treatment
2 BRINTON, A HISTORY OF WESTERN MORALS 93 (1959) ; KINSEY, POMEROY, &
MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE HUMAN MALE 660 (1948); East, Sexual
Offenders, MENTAL ABNORMALITY AND CRIME 177, 186 (Radzinowicz & Turner ed.
1949).
3 LEWINSOHN, A HISTORY OF SEXUAL CUSTOMS 29-30 (1958).
4 Leviticus 18: 7, 22; Leviticus 20: 13.
U KINSEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 465; Bowman & Engle, A Psychiatric
Evaluation of the Laws of Homosexuality, 29 TEmIp. L.Q. 273,277 (1956).
6 GUTTMACHER, SEX OFFENSES 11 (1951).
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of the sexual deviate remains today, as it was five centuries ago, the
product of religious tenets, free of the modifications urged by the
psychologist and sociologist. Added to this is the American belief that
moral and social conformity must be maintained and the naive assump-
tion that this conformity can be enforced through legislation. Analysis
of the statutory regulation of sexually deviant behavior may indicate a
difference in degree of punishment, but the prevailing philosophy of
Biblical and medieval societies of death by burial or burning or life
imprisonment does not differ from that which imposes imprisonment for
twenty years with no right of probation or a custodial sentence of
indeterminate length.
THE CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF SEXUAL DEVIATION
It is impossible to compile a list with any certitude that it will
contain all those transgressions of the law that are classifiable as crimes
of the sexually deviant. Many criminal acts, that on the surface appear
free of a sexual impulse, contain sexual overtones. Murder, burglary,
theft, arson and assault are often sexually inspired.' Rape and prosti-
tution are more clearly sexual; however, in the absence of additional
factors these violations of the law may not be acts of sexual deviation.8
However they may be styled, the crimes of indecent assault, homo-
sexuality, bestiality, pedophilia, exhibitionism, and voyeurism are those
which most usually invoke the appellation of sexually deviant crimes.
Ohio, by statutory enactment, has attempted to deal with this area
of behavior. Four substantive provisions are of immediate import in this
field; these are supplemented by municipal ordinances curtailing activi-
ties of disorderly conduct disruptive to the peace of the local com-
munity." Further, the law provides for special disposition of those
offenders who are found to be "mentally deficient and psychopathic."' 1
Of the substantive enactments, the sodomy statute deals with that
area most generally thought of as sexual deviation.12 The approach of
the law to sodomy is representative of attitudes frequently present in the
whole of regulation of the sexual offender. As set forth in the statute,
the offense of sodomy is that of "carnal copulation with a beast, or any
7BROMBERG, CRIME AND THE MIND 84, 85 (1948).
s For consideration of distinctive elements in rape, see GUTMACHER, Op. Cit.
suPra note 6, at 50.
9 OHIO REV. CODE §8 2905.44, 2903.01, 2905.02, 2905.30 (1953).
10 OHIO REV. CODE § 715.49 (1953); CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES
§ 13.1302 (Indecent Language and Behavior), § 13.1303 (Indecent Exposure),
§ 13.1305 (Lewd, Lacivious, Acts, Words, Gestures, etc.) (1951); CINCINNATI,
OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 901-il (Indecent Behavior), § 901-i2 (Indecent Ex-
posure) (1957); COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODES § 29.20 (Disorderly Conduct),
§ 29.52 (Indecent Conduct, Filthy Acts, etc.), § 29.59 (Molesting Females) (1959).
11 OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2947.24-.29 (1954).
12 OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.44 (1953).
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openings of the body, except sexual parts, with another human being." 13
The statute fails to define with any certainty the manner in which the
crime may be committed and resort must therefore be had to the courts
for a construction of the statutory language as to the elements of the
crime.
The rule of strict construction of penal statutes does not
require the courts to go to the extent of defeating the purpose
of the statute by a severely technical application of the rule.' 4
Having said this the courts expand the common law definition of sodomy
to encompass acts not a part of the common law offense.' 5 The penalty
for this crime is a sentence of not less than one nor more than twenty
years.
16
Pedophilia is proscribed in Ohio by statutes punishing an assault
upon a child under sixteen' 7 and punishing rape of a female under
twelve.'" The indecent assault of the first of the above statutes need
not satisfy the general legal test for criminal assault. It seems sufficient
that a child be disturbed by the exposure of an adult if the proximity of
the adult is reasonably immediate. 9 Again, the interpretation of the
statute by the court exhibits the tendency to give the statutory language
the broadest of meanings. The penalty for assault of a child is con-
finement from one to ten years, or a fine of $100 to $1000, or both.
The punishment for rape of a female under twelve is life imprisonment.
The fourth of the substantive statutory provisions is that dealing
with indecent exposure by any person over eighteen years of age in any
public place or in any place where there is a likelihood that the act will
be observed.2" The punishment for violation of this statute is a maximum
sentence of six months, a fine of not more than $200, or both.
The procedural steps preliminary to an adjudication of the above
offenses are similar in the case of the indictment or information. The
statutory words or a slight variation thereof are considered sufficient to
13 OHIo REV. CODE § 2905.44 (1953).
14 State v. Price, 12 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 349, 352 (C.P. 1911), quoting from
Castor v. State, 75 Ohio St. 52, 69, 78 N.E. 957, 959 (1906).
15 State v. Price, supra note 14, at 350.
16 Onto REv. CODE § 2951.04 (1953) provides that there shall be no probation
in cases of conviction for sodomy.
17 Onto REV. CODE § 2903.01 (1953). "No person over the age of eighteen
years shall assault a child under the age of sixteen years, and willfully take
indecent liberties with the person of such child, without committing or intending
to commit the crime of rape upon such child, or willfully make improper exposure
of his person in the presence of such child. . . 21
18 OHio Rav. CODE § 2905.02 (1953). "No person shall have carnal knowledge
of his daughter, sister, or a female person under twelve years of age, forcibly and
against her will .... "
19 State v. Green, 84 Ohio App. 298, 82 N.E.2d 105 (1948).
20 OHio REV. CODE § 2905.30 (1953). "No person eighteen years of age or
over shall willfully make an indecent exposure of his person in a public place or
in a place where there are other persons to be offended or annoyed thereby. .. ."
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inform the accused of the charge against him. It has not been the usual
practice to describe the particular manner of the commission of the act;
"extreme particularity is not necessary." 21
The entire area of sexual offenses is affected by the Ohio "sexual
psychopath" statutes.22 These sections supplement the general criminal
prohibitions in cases where the "applicable penal sentence will not afford
to the public proper protection against possible future criminal conduct."
After conviction and before sentence the trial court must refer the vio-
lator of enumerated offenses to the Department of Mental Hygiene or
to a psychiatric clinic or to three psychiatrists for examination. The
court may refer any felony, except murder in the first degree, or "any
misdemeanor involving a sex offense, or in which abnormal sexual
21 State v. Zarhorst, 75 Ohio St. 232, 79 N.E. 238 (1906); State v. Stewart,
38 Ohio L. Abs. 543, 50 N.E.2d 910 (Ct. App. 1943); King v. New London,
8 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 34 (C.P. 1907).
22 OHIo REV. CODE § 2947.24 (1954). "Definitions. Sections 2947.24 to 2947.29,
inclusive, of the Revised Code shall be administered by the criminal courts in
dealing with mentally deficient offenders in cases in which the court finds that the
imposition or continued enforcement of the applicable penal sentence will not afford
to the public proper protection against possible future criminal conduct of such
mentally deficient or psychopathic offenders. (B) 'psychopathic offender' means
any person who is adjudged to have a psychopathic personality, who exhibits
criminal tendencies and who by reason thereof is a menace to the public. Psycho-
pathic personality is evidenced by such traits or characteristics inconsistent with
the age of such person, as emotional immaturity and instability, impulsive,
irresponsive, reckless and unruly acts, excessively self-centered attitudes, deficient
powers of self-discipline, lack of normal capacity to learn from experience, marked
deficiency of moral sense or control." Section 2947.25 provides: "After conviction
and before sentence, a trial court must refer for examination all persons convicted
under Sections 2903.01, 2905.02, 2905.03, 2905.04, 2905.07, or 2905.44 of the Revised
Code, to the department of mental hygiene and correction or to a state facility
designated by the department, or to a psychopathic clinic approved by the depart-
ment, or to three psychiatrists. Prior to sentence the court may refer for such
examination any person who has been convicted of any felony except murder in
the first degree where mercy has not been recommended, or any misdemeanor
involving a sex offense, or in which abnormal sexual tendencies are displayed,
when it has been suggested or appears to the court that such person is mentally
ill, or a mentally deficient or psychopathic offender .... The department, clinic, or
psychiatrists shall make a careful examination of such person and furnish the court
a report in writing of the finding as to the mental condition of the person. ...
The court shall conduct a hearing thereon .... If upon consideration of such report
and such other evidence as is submitted the court finds that such person is . . . a
psychopathic offender . . . the court shall enter such finding in the records and
shall impose the appropriate sentence for the offense of which the person was
convicted. At the same time the court shall enter an order of indefinite commitment
of such person to the department, during the continuance of which the execution of
the sentence shall be suspended. Thereupon such person shall be sent to an appro-
priate institution designated by the department. If the department, because of
lack of facilities, fails to designate an appropriate institution, such person shall be
sent to the institution to which he would have been sentenced had he not been
adjudged . . . a psychopathic offender. .. .
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tendencies are displayed" to the Department of Mental Hygiene for
examination. The examining body, upon examination of the offender,
renders a report in writing to the court containing its findings, together
with recommendations, suggestions and opinions. Upon receipt of the
report a hearing is held. If the court after consideration of the report
finds the offender mentally ill (Ohio Revised Code § 5123.01) or if
it finds him to be "a mentally deficient or psychopathic offender" it
imposes the appropriate sentence for the offense of which the person
was convicted; at the same time it hands down an order of indefinite
commitment of the offender to an appropriate institution for treatment
or purely custodial purposes. The release from the indeterminate sen-
tence is effected only if the offender is found to have improved so that
"he no longer needs the special custody, care, or treatment of such in-
stitution." Such a decision rests in the hands of the superintendent of the
institution to which the offender is committed. If the offender obtains
the certification of improvement and after further examination is found
to be sufficiently cured, he may be released. At this time he is either
transferred to the appropriate penal institution to serve the remaining
term of his sentence or freed under supervision if the penal sentence has
been satisfied.
The letter of some of the substantive laws dealing with sexual
deviation is often tempered by a minimum of enforcement. It is only
in cases of violence, corruption of minors and public solicitation that a
vigilant attempt is made to require compliance with the legal standard.23
This laxity is on occasions, generally following an extremely outrageous
sex crime, the subject of journalistic criticism. Such an attack results in
a zealous enforcement of all sexual statutes and ordinances until the
pressure to "clean up" the community is removed. The arrest of the
non-violent sexual offender then lapses to lie dormant until something
again arouses a public crusade against all sexual offenders.
CRITIQUE
Enactments which aim at the prohibition of certain conduct should
meet some objective criteria of excellence. Ideally, they should (1)
curtail those acts which result in probable harm to the community and
its inhabitants, (2) define with the greatest possible exactness those pro-
scribed activities, (3) incorporate all the procedural safeguards due the
accused, (4) grade the severity of the punishment to fit the degree of
the crime, and (5) take account of the enforcement and treatment
facilities available. What is the measure of the existent Ohio law by
these criteria?
Initially, it must again be stated that the particular problem pre-
sented by laws dealing with sexual transgressions is the common tendency
23 KINS EY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 391-92; MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5,
comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956); PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 209 (1951);
Bowman & Engle, supra note 5, at 295-96; Note, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 162 (1949).
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to codify moral standards and enforce these standards even though some
lapses from them do no harm to the secular interests of the community.
In the pursuit of this goal of moral conformity the laws are enforcing
a standard of conduct the validity of which has been questioned.2"
Kinsey points out that morals vary with the many different social levels
(determined by educational level, occupational class, and paternal in-
fluences)." Faced with this kaleidoscopic nature of social mores it is
impossible to incorporate any set of moral standards in the law that
speaks for more than a segment of the population. Witness the fact that
the enforcement of the law rests with two divergent social groups, the
better educated social strata of judges, lawyers, and state legislators and
those with an entirely different educational background, the police officers.
Within the operation of the legal procedure, this conflict of mores results
in an uneven functioning of the law; arrests generally reflect the police
officer's moral predilections while trials and sentences often mirror the
judge's moral views.20
To the extent that the law attempts to regulate matters that are
the concern of the spiritual bodies it is rendering a "service" that the
criminal law should not be called upon to do. A compromise between
the concerns of the community in legal as differentiated from religious
matters is desirable.2 ' This, to a degree, is an educational matter that
cannot be easily corrected. American society has put particular emphasis
upon the presence of the law in the province of morals and might be
shocked by the withdrawl of legal sanctions. But there seem to be
indications of changes in the public attitudes toward sexual mores with
a more lenient interpretation of the kind of -behavior condemned as sexual
delinquency. s Further, it is clear that there is no necessary "decay" in
the social structure in countries where moral issues are left to the moral
authorities. France, Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, and Mexico
have recognized the distinction; their codes leave moral judgments and
sanctions to bodies other than the judiciary, i.e., society and religion.29
There are matters which combine morals and necessity. To the
extent that necessity demands sanctions, these laws are justified. The
violator cannot be allowed to harm the social fabric by commission of
crimes of violence or crimes involving children. The moral basis for
these laws is backed by a social need for regulation of asocial behavior.30
24 East, supra note 2, at 178; Porterfield & Salley, Current Folkways of
Sexual Behavior, 52 AM. J. SoCIoL. 209 (1949); Glueck, An Evaluation of the
Homosexual Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 187 (1957).
25 KINSEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 329.
26 KINSEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 389.
27 THE PROBLEM OF HOMOSEXUALITY, AN INTERIM REPORT (1954), published
by the Church of England Moral Welfare Council.
28 Bowman & Engle, supra note 5, at 311 ; Glueck, supra note 24, at 193.
29 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956) ; Bowman
& Engle, supra note 5, at 304.
30 PLOSCOWE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 213.
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Once society does assume that legal curtailment is necessary
(whether it be the result of social prejudice or social need) the language
employed in the legislation is frequently vague."' This absence of de-
finitive drafsmanship may be the reflection of the revulsion of legislators
to abnormal sexual impulses and a result of uncertainty as to what the
law is really attempting to accomplish.
Left open to individual interpretation are many matters that should
be settled by the written law once it invades the field. How far will the
decisions go in the expansion of the plastic language of the statutes? 32
Is the language equally applicable to persons of both sexes? 33 Are the
statutes to be read to include certain sexual acts that may often be a part
of the marital relationship?34 By leaving the language open to personal
interpretation the drafters allow great discretion to the law enforcement
officers in making arrests. Further, the statutes are subject to ad hoe
treatment by the judiciary, making each case a reflection of the biases
and class standards of the judge.3
Criminal statutes should not employ words of art. For example,
there should be no need for judicial interpretation of "sodomy," when
it would be possible to compile a list of specific offenses.3" Nor should
the elements of an assault vary with the facts of the case."
The catalog of offenses-homosexuality, bestiality, exhibitionism,
and voyeurism-makes no distinction between a single experimentation
or transgression and the persistent offender with a record of sexual vio-
lations. All such persons are subject to the same degree of punishment.
The sodomy statute of Ohio makes no differentiation between the acts
of consenting adults in private and the offender who finds his sexual
gratification with children or through public solicitation." Local ordi-
31 BPOMBERG, oP. cit. supra note 7, at 81; MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
CRIMINAL 143 (1958) ; Note, 29 IND. L.J. 539 (1954).
32 State v. Tarrant, 83 Ohio App. 199, 80 N.E.2d 509 (1948); Franklin v.
State, 14 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 253 (Cir. Ct. 1910).
3 3 KINSEY, POMEROY, MARTIN, & GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF THE HUMAN
FEMALE 484, n.36 (1953), found no reported case in the United States where the
sodomy statute has been applied to a female for a conviction. But cf. Foster v.
State, 1 Ohio C.C.R. 467 (Cir. Ct. 1886), holding that a party of either sex can be
guilty of sodomy.
34 State v. Forquer, 74 Ohio App. 293, 58 N.E.2d 696 (1944), has held
cunnilingus is not a crime in Ohio under the sodomy statute. This decision still
leaves unanswered many questions as to the status of heterosexual acts.
35 Barnett v. State, 104 Ohio St. 298, 135 N.E. 647 (1922), is an example of
judicial reaction to the sexual offender. Such an individual is termed a "moral
degenerate," a "sex pervert," and a "moral leper."
36 State v. Tarrant, supra note 32; Franklin v. State, supra note 32; State v.
Price, supra note 14. Cf. 66 N.Y. PENAL LAws § 690 (1958).
37 State v. Green, supra note 19.
38OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.44 (1953). Compare 66 N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 690
(1958) providing for three degrees of offense in the case of sodomy.
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nances, with disregard of all factors other than the specific arts in
question, bunch prohibitions under such unenlightening terms as "lewd,
lacivious acts, words, gestures, etc."39 or "indecent conduct, filthy acts,
etc."
40
This problem of vagueness is found in other areas where the sexual
mores of the society are involved. In the area of obscenity the vague-
ness of state statutes has been tested before the United States Supreme
Court. The statutes have been upheld if there is a reasonable standard
for ascertaining guilt-the standard' to be applied is that of the "con-
temporary community."' But Mr. Justice Reed's question remains
unanswered by this decision:
Are the tests of the Puritan or the Cavalier to be applied,
those of the city or the farm, the Christian or non-Christian,
the old or the young?4"
If we accept Kinsey's view that there is no "average," but rather many
"averages," each reflecting a part of the community, it seems vain to
search for the moral standards of the contemporary community. It is
no answer to vague statutory language to conjure a test that is equally
unascertainable.
In addition to the vagueness of statutory language and the broad-
ness of the interpretation rendered by the judiciary, there is the absence
of full procedural safeguards. A summary of the statutory words with-
out a definitive account of the nature, manner, time or parties satisfies
the procedural requisites for a valid indictment. 43 This uncertainty is
modified by the presence of the bill of particulars provisions in Ohio.
The defendant is thereby afforded an opportunity to fully acquaint him-
self with the detailed factors of the indictment and in this way prepare
his defense.
In many cases a defendant is not allowed, in the hearing wherein
he is charged with sodomy, to present evidence of his previous sexual
conduct which may have been exclusively heterosexual. 44 Conduct pre-
cedent to the commission of the act or evidence of a purely heterosexual
orientation are viewed as irrelevant in such a hearing. This view fails
to see any gradations in the commission of the crime; all offenders are
lumped into the same classification without regard to motivation.
Great variance is present in the sentences for violation of certain
sexual statutes. Uniformity in attitude is nonexistent among the states.
The penalties are therefore dependent upon the sophistication of each
state legislature in its consideration of sexual crimes. For example,
New York has by statute made homosexual acts between consenting
39 CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 13.1305 (1951).
40 COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODES § 29.52 (1959).
41 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957).
42 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 284 (1952).
43 See note 21 supra.
44 Bowman & Engle, supra note 5, at 287.
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adults a misdemeanor" while Nevada treats any homosexual act-
without consideration of the ages of the parties involved or any con-
sentual factors-as a felony punishable by life imprisonment.4" Such a
great disparity is unknown in any other area of the criminal law. It
should be noted that in the majority of American jurisdictions, in-
cluding Ohio, all sodomitic acts are subject to punishment as great or
greater than forcible rape.47 The law to this extent depends not upon
the injury, potential or real, but rather on the intolerance of the drafters
to acts motivated by a drive viewed as sinful or disgusting.
The lack of uniformity in the law should not in itself be an
element of concern. However, it ends in making crime geographical.
Whether one is a major felon or a misdemeanant depends not upon the
act committed, but upon the state one is in at the time. This is not a
case of having to draw a line somewhere, for in most states, including
Ohio, no effort has been made to deal with the gradations of the act.
Rather all acts are condemned as felonies free of any external con-
siderations.
What can be the justification for allowing the laws as they are
now drafted to stand? Do these laws actually act as a deterrent to the
exhibitionist or voyeurist? Will they encourage a homosexual to seek
psychiatric treatment for his illness?
Laws are effective in so far as they are enforced, not in a manner
of capricious selection, but with uniformity. If such enforcement were
present then the sexual deviate's actions could be deterred and he might
often seek treatment. But there are currently insufficient facilities for
real enforcement of all the sexual laws on the books, and small chance
of an appreciable increase in enforcement agencies numerous enough to
make stringent enforcement a reality.4" The public act and the act of
violence are subject to constant enforcement. A reconsideration of the
sexual laws would still treat these activities as criminal. In this present
atmosphere of selective enforcement a no-man's-land is created; the law
is converted to the tool of the blackmailer.49 Thereby the unrealistic
laws compound the problem of the legal agencies by facilitating a crimi-
nal activity as reprehensible as the proscribed sexual conduct.
The real deterrent to sexual deviation is public exposure rather than
punishment. The social and religious condemnation of such activity,
not legal chastisement, acts to brake unacceptable sex inclinations.' °
45 66 N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 690 (1958).
4 6 NEv. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1957).
47 See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2905.01, .44 (1953).
48 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956) ; Note, 17
U. CHi. L. REV. 162 (1949).
4 9 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956).
5o GIueck, supra note 24, at 201, 203.
1959]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Many of the shortcomings of the substantive laws seem answered
by statutes dealing with psychopathic offenders." These laws appear to
be based upon an educated desire to get away from the time-honored
manner of dealing with sexual criminals. To the extent that they do
provide for psychiatric examination of offenders they are an advance-
ment over the regular penal statutes. But examination of this legislation
raises questions as to their utility.
Critics of these laws find them an expression of two distinct
attitudes.
Mental illness is to be recognized as a condition that requires
special treatment somewhat different from the customary penal
law enforcement procedure. 52
This reliance upon scientific aid in legal determinations and a desire to
be humane is often coupled with a contradictory position.
The demands of the "people's voice" occasionally couched in
rational argument but more often expressed with hysterical
fervor for more restrictive measures against sex criminals had
to be met somehow by the various legislatures, since important
groups seemed to feel that ordinary legislation was not suffi-
cient to protect the community from the perpetration and
repetition of heinous crimes by sex fiends. The sexual psycho-
path laws seemed to serve admirably this purpose of added
protection.
53
Too often these acts were passed with high expectations as to their
utility, but without a complete study of their application in practice or
much heed to the caution urged by the psychologists and sociologists."4
"The present formulation does not permit evaluation of deviation
to be made according to objective legal, medical, or common-sense
standards." 55
No attempt is made in Ohio's act for "psychopathic offenders" to
distinguish the dangerous sexual offender from the private offender or
the nuisance. Any violation "involving a sexual offense, or in which
abnormal sexual tendencies are displayed" suffices for classification under
the sexual psychopathic provisions. Inherent in such reasoning is the
assumption that one illegal sexual act makes one a "psychopath." It is
clear from the reading of the statute that no allowance is made for
adolescent experimentation, or a one time "thrill," or acts under alco-
51 OHIO REV. CODE § 2947.24-.29 (1954).
52 Hacker & Flynn, The Sexual Psychopath Act in Practice: 4 Critical Dis-
cussion, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 766, 767 (1955).
53 Ibid.
54 GUIrMACHER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 121; PLOSCOWE, op. cit. supra note
23 at 237; Fahr, Iowa's New Sexual Psychopath Law-4n Experiment Noble in
Purpose, 41 IOWA L. REv. 523, 524 (1956).
55 Hacker & Flynn, supra note 52, at 771.
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holic influence, or acts that are part of the marital relationship. It is
difficult to see these acts, without additional factors, as psychopathic.
The word "psychopathic" is itself ambiguous. The attempt at
definition in the Ohio act is preferable to total silence. 56 However, no
objective standard is provided: "emotional immaturity" or "instability"
or "deficient powers of self discipline" are criteria applicable to a large
percentage of the population-these are traits which hardly suffice to
make one a criminal "psychopathic offender." The word "psychopath"
has been abandoned in psychiatric circles as unacceptable due to its
generality and inexactitude.5 7 Yet it continues to be used in the law as
though it had some exact meaning.
Indefinite commitment provided by the statute can often result in
removal of the offender for a period longer than the sentence under the
applicable criminal statutes.5" This makes the statute a useful device for
ridding a community of an offender for a long period of time. With
this possibility in mind it is convenient to insure that the sexual psycho-
path statute is applied to social undesirables without regard to the gravity
of the offense. In Ohio there is at least the requirement that there first
be a conviction under the applicable penal statute before the sexual
psychopath provisions come into play."0 The offender is guaranteed the
right of a formal trial and conviction. But after conviction who is to
judge whether the defendant represents a "menace" to the community?
After the commitment of the offender to an institution for treat-
ment, he remains subject to the penal sentence upon his release after
"'cure." Since the psychopathic offender does not meet Ohio's legal test
for insanity, he is fully responsible for all acts committed while he was
"psychopathic." 60
The sexual psychopath laws are based upon scientific premises that
are not supported by psychological investigation.6 Primarily, the special
classification of sexual offenders as "psychopaths' assumes a conscious
choice to be possible in the selection of activity by the offender, that is,
the offender is not to be viewed as "insane." Ohio's criteria for insanity
remains the M'Naghten rule, i.e., a knowledge that the act is wrong.
Acceptance of this standard narrows the area of activities that might be
classed as insanity under the broader tests of "irresistible impulse" (total
incapacity for self-control) or the Durham case ruling ("that the ac-
cused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or defect").
56 OHIO REV. CODE § 2947.24(B) (1954). See note 22 supra.
57 DAVIDSON, FORENsIC PSYCHIATRY 318 (1952).
5 8 The maximum sentences applicable to the sexual crimes considered: OHIO
REV. CODE §§ 2903.01 (up to ten years), 2905.02 (life imprisonment), 2905.30 (up
to six months), 2905.44 (up to twenty years) (1953).
59 OHIO REV. CODE § 2947.25 (1954).
60 OHIO REV. CODE § 2947.27 (1954).
61 BROMBERO, op. cit. supra note 7, at 81-84; Bowman & Engle, supra note 5,
at 279.
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Secondly, the sexual psychopath laws assume that the sexual criminal
is a habitual offender who progresses from one stage of sexual violation
to another, more antisocial, stage. They also assume that by checking
the early activity through removal of the individual, society is safe-
guarding itself from some flagrant sexual crime. In short, the sexual
offender is thought to be highly recidivistic. Examination of cases does
not support this assumption.62 Quite the contrary appears to be the case.
Our investigations, as well as others, indicate first, that there
is a low degree of recidivism among sexual offenders, and
second, that there is no basis for the common belief that sex
criminals engage in sexual crimes of progressive malignancy.
6 3
It therefore becomes hard to justify the treatment of conduct which is
merely annoying by the same standards as are applied to violent conduct.
This, however, is the present status of the law which sees no degree in
sexual deviation and imagines every sexual transgression to contain the
roots of brutal sexual acts.
There is probably the greatest amount of disagreement in this area
regarding the prognosis of cure of the sexual deviate through treat-
ment. 4 If medical and psychological therapy can aid the deviate, and
there is no certainty that it can, there arises the problem of facilities
available for such therapy. There is no public institution in Ohio, at
the present time, designed to cope with this problem. The sexual crimi-
nal must therefore seek treatment in a private institution or be committed
to some institution with neither the facilities nor personnel for such
specialized treatment. Confinement of sexual offenders in ordinary penal
institutions may result in an aggravation of the condition of homosexual
prisoners6 5 while other classes of deviate prisoners would often be subject
to physical abuse.
The end result is that we presently have legislation that looks pro-
gressive and will therefore be pointed to as exemplary of far-sighted
legal treatment of the deviate, but legislation which, behind the facade
of progress, is ineffective, inefficient, unenlightened, and positively un-
fair. It is time for a change.
RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENTS
The area is rife with emotional reactions and it is vain to hope
that it can be approached free of these subjective preconceptions. It is
also essential to note that the law can never move too far ahead of the
62 CALIFORNIA SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEX CRIME, PRELIMINARY REPORT 43 (1950);
COMMITMENT AND RELEASE OF SEXUAL DEVIATES (ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL)
36-38 (1951) ; MAYOR'S COMMITTEE REPORT FOR THE STUDY OF SEX OFFENSES (NEW
YORK CITY) 38, 94 (1941).
63 GUTTMACHER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 113, 114.
64 MACDONALD, op. cit. supra note 31, at 148; MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5,
comment, app. C (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956).
65 PLOSCOWE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 213 ; Bowman & Engle, supra note 5,
at 280.
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accepted standards of the community or communities of which it is a part.
Practicable suggestions are a change in the present substantive laws
considered above. It is time that the prudish, hush-hush attitude that
pervades thinking on matters sexual be abandoned; that the law attempt
to spell out what it means with the maximum of exactitude. Parts of the
New York code are exemplary of an enlightened attempt at specificity
in detailing specific substantive offenses with punishments in proportion
to the crime.66 The American Law Institute's tentative drafts of the
Model Penal Code illustrate this same educated approach to sexual
offenses in legislative provisions." It is time we realized that the crimi-
nal law is not a suitable medium for the expression of moral disapproval.
There is no reason for the law to include matters which are generally
ignored and seldom enforced. The goal of the substantive law should
be to regulate those deviate sexual practices that do involve force, cor-
ruption of minors, and public offenses. The remaining sexual trans-
gressions should be left to religious and social pressures.
The "sexual psychopath" law should be abandoned as an ill-advised
experiment. In its place should be: legislation that is worked out through
the cooperation of law and medical science; legislation which sets out
specific criteria to aid the psychiatrist and the judge in reaching a de-
termination regarding the mental state of the offender; legislation which
provides for utilization of the available facilities for the treatment of
those individuals who threaten, rather than annoy, the community, i.e.,
the pedophile and the forcible assaulter; and criteria which make an
indeterminate sentence possible should be formulated in terms of specific
violations which are of a dangerous character.
66 "A person who carnally knows any male or female person by the anus or
by or with the mouth against the will of such other person, or (1) When through
idiocy, imbecility, or any unsoundness of mind . . . such other person is incapable
of giving consent, or by reason of mental or physical weakness, or immaturity ...
such other person does not offer resistance; or, (2) When such other person's
resistance is forcibly overcome; or, (3) When such other person's resistance is
prevented by fear of immediate and great bodily harm . . .; or, (4) When such
other person's resistance is prevented by stupor or weakness of mind produced by
an intoxicating, or narcotic . . . agent ... ; or, (5) When such other person is at
the time, unconscious of the nature of the act, and this is known to the defendant,
. . . is guilty of sodomy in the first degree and is punishable with imprisonment of
not more than twenty years or with imprisonment for an indeterminate term the
minimum of which shall be one day and the maximum of which shall be the
duration of his natural life. A person twenty-one years of age or over who
carnally knows by the anus or by or with the mouth any male or female under the
age of eighteen, under circumstances not amounting to sodomy in the first degree
is guilty of sodomy in the second degree and punishable with imprisonment of not
more than ten years. A person who carnally knows any male or female person ...
under circumstances not amounting to sodomy in the first degree or sodomy in the
second degree is guilty of a misdemeanor." 66 N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 690 (1958).
67 MoDtL PENAL CODE § 207.4, comment; § 207.5, comment; § 207.6, comment
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956).
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Finally, all is in vain unless facilities are established, with adequate
personnel, to deal with the sexual offender committed for therapy.
Existent medical institutions and prison facilities are unacceptable for
this purpose. We cannot abandon all sexual deviates to an indeterminate
sentence which is nothing more than custodial. Whatever his violation
he cannot be isolated and forgotten-he is not a "moral leper."
CONCLUSION
This examination of our moral standards in the area of sexual
deviation points up the realization that some of the views of the past are
invalid in a world grown more wise through scientific investigation. In
some communities the law has begun to reflect these refinements, in
others it remains unmodified. Ohio's law can no longer wear a mantle
of moral respectability-it has become immoral to refuse to recognize
the stagnation present in the existent laws on sexual deviation. A revision
of Ohio's sex laws is badly needed, and acceptance of the findings of the
psychiatrist, psychologist, and sociologist must not be ignored. Expediency
and bias can no longer be the basis of our treatment of the sexual violator.
Although the criminal fails in his duty to society, we are not
thereby relieved of our duty to him.-Norwood East
Phillip E. Stebbins
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